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Perspective-takingA central claim in research on interactive conversation is that listeners use the knowledge assumed to be
shared with a conversational partner to guide their understanding of utterances from the earliest
moments of processing. In the present study we investigated whether this claim extends to cases where
shared vs. private knowledge is discrepant in terms of the identity assigned to a mutually seen object that
could be misidentiﬁed on the basis of its appearance. Eye movement measures were used to evaluate lis-
teners’ ability to integrate a speaker’s perspective as they identiﬁed the referent for an unfolding expres-
sion. The results reconﬁrmed previous ﬁndings showing that listeners can rapidly take into account a
speaker’s awareness of the existence/presence of a referential object. In contrast, however, listeners
showed strong consideration of their private knowledge about the identity of an object during referential
processing. Strikingly, this tendency was found even when speaker-produced discourse reinforced the
way in which the speaker’s understanding of the object’s identity differed from that of the listener.
Together, the results reveal clear and important differences in the way in which distinct types of
perspective-based cues are integrated in real-time communicative interaction.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Successful communication requires conversational participants
to differentiate between what is known to all interlocutors (shared
information) vs. what is known to only themselves (privileged
information). Indeed, numerous psycholinguistic studies have
shown that speakers take shared knowledge into account when
constructing utterances, and that addressees use shared knowl-
edge to guide their understanding of utterances (e.g., Clark,
Schreuder, & Buttrick, 1983; Fussell & Krauss, 1989; Gerrig &
Littman, 1990; Gibbs, Mueller, & Cox, 1988). For a given conversa-
tional participant, determining what information is likely shared
and what is privileged is itself a complex process that draws on
multiple sources of information such as community membership
as well as the situational and linguistic context (Clark &
Marshall, 1981) and, accordingly, entails various cognitive
demands. Consequently, one question that is still widely discussed
in contemporary work on real-time referential processing involves
the extent to which shared and privileged knowledge are effec-
tively differentiated in the earliest moments of comprehension(e.g., Barr, 2008b; Brown-Schmidt, 2012; Brown-Schmidt,
Gunlogson, & Tanenhaus, 2008; Ferguson & Breheny, 2011;
Ferguson & Breheny, 2012; Hanna & Tanenhaus, 2004; Hanna,
Tanenhaus, & Trueswell, 2003; Heller, Grodner, & Tanenhaus,
2008; Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner, 2000; Keysar, Barr, &
Horton, 1998; Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003; Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2010).
In most experimental studies addressing this question, the sta-
tus of knowledge as privileged vs. shared is manipulated by vary-
ing the physical co-presence of the entities that are available for
reference. For example, an object may be visually occluded from
the perspective of one conversational partner, thereby preventing
that partner from knowing whether there is an object behind the
occluder (and what it is). By incorporating this individual’s per-
spective, the other partner should, in turn, reduce any expectation
for that object to be referred to. In the current study, knowledge
differences are instead manipulated by varying interlocutors’
understanding of the ‘‘identity’’ of entities in a situation where
their existence and physical co-presence is already established.
This is achieved through the use of objects whose outward appear-
ance is potentially deceptive when it comes to the task of deter-
mining the category to which the object belongs (e.g., a candle
that looks like a lightbulb). As we will show, a direct comparison
of perspective differences involving physical co-presence vs. the
identity of entities can provide new and important insights into
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in conversational contexts.
In the following sections, we provide a brief overview of
research examining listeners’ use of perspective information in
the course of real-time referential interpretation, as well as
research examining the ability to overcome misleading visual cues
about an object’s true nature. We then describe a series of experi-
ments investigating listeners’ ability to coordinate shared and priv-
ileged knowledge about object identity in the course of real time
spoken language comprehension.1.1. Perspective and common ground in real-time comprehension
As mentioned earlier, a core issue discussed in many recent
studies of common ground in comprehension is the time course
with which comprehenders can integrate knowledge about a con-
versational partner’s knowledge and beliefs as language is heard.
This is an important question because establishing the timing of
common ground integration relative to other processes involved
in language comprehension, such as syntactic and semantic analy-
ses, is critical for delineating the architecture of the language com-
prehension system. To address this question, studies typically use a
visual-world eye tracking methodology to measure the point at
which shared knowledge (i.e., ‘‘common ground’’) is used in the
course of interpreting an unfolding referential expression. Some
studies have suggested that a listener’s egocentric perspective pre-
dominates during language processing and that the integration of
common ground occurs only if linguistic input fails to disam-
biguate the referent (e.g., Barr, 2008b; Keysar et al., 1998; Keysar
et al., 2000; Keysar et al., 2003; Kronmüller & Barr, 2007;
Pickering & Garrod, 2004). For example, in Keysar et al. (2000), crit-
ical displays included multiple objects from the same category,
such as three candles that differed in size (e.g., small, medium,
and large). On critical trials, the addressee/participant was directed
by a physically co-present speaker/confederate to pick up the small
candle in a situation where the smallest candle visible to the
addressee was not visible to the speaker. The authors reported that
addressees’ eye movement behavior reﬂected an initial tendency to
ﬁrst consider this ‘‘privileged-perspective’’ object (smallest candle)
as a referential candidate, and only well past the offset of the crit-
ical adjective did addressees identify the smaller of the two
mutually-visible candles as the intended referent.
However, evidence from other studies has challenged the
egocentric-ﬁrst view by showing that, although addressees do
not inhibit their egocentric perspective completely, shared knowl-
edge does have a measurable inﬂuence on referential mappings
from the earliest moments of interpretation in a variety of circum-
stances involving different types of referring expressions (e.g.,
Brown-Schmidt, 2012; Brown-Schmidt et al., 2008; Ferguson &
Breheny, 2011; Ferguson & Breheny, 2012; Hanna & Tanenhaus,
2004; Hanna et al., 2003; Heller et al., 2008). For example, Heller
et al. drew on known properties of referential contrast to test
whether addressees are sensitive to the distinction between shared
and privileged knowledge as temporarily ambiguous modiﬁers
were heard in real time. Critical displays contained two sets of
objects contrasting in size (e.g., big box vs. small box and big duck
vs. small duck). A member of one of the contrasting pairs was vis-
ible only to the addressee (e.g., the small box was hidden from the
speaker’s view) whereas both members of the other pair (big duck
and small duck) were mutually visible. The authors showed that,
upon hearing the temporarily ambiguous contrastive adjective in
instructions such as pick up the big duck, addressees rapidly limited
consideration to the intended target object due to its membership
in the mutually known contrast set. The other object that was
semantically compatible with the adjective (big box) was notconsidered because this item would not require a modiﬁer from
the speaker’s perspective (and instead would simply be called the
box). This growing body of work suggests that shared and privi-
leged knowledge about referential candidates is effectively man-
aged at both larger and smaller time scales, including temporary
indeterminacies in the unfolding signal.
It is important to consider, however, other kinds of knowledge
discrepancies that might be more challenging for comprehenders
to manage, perhaps because they involve different kinds of under-
lying mechanisms. In the studies described above, knowledge dif-
ferences across speakers and listeners were manipulated by
varying what we will call the ‘‘existence’’ of referential entities in
the situational context. In a typical experiment, the speaker (a con-
federate) instructs the addressee (the actual participant) to move
objects located in open shelf compartments, some of which are
not visible from the perspective of the speaker because a cover
occludes the contents of the shelf compartment. As such, one inter-
locutor essentially possesses more knowledge than the other, and
this knowledge pertains to the existence of referential entities in
the relevant context. Although this approach has provided an
important methodological template for numerous studies, includ-
ing work on cognitive development and individual differences in
perspective taking (e.g., Hanna et al., 2003; Keysar et al., 2000;
Nadig & Sedivy, 2002), it provides only one means to explore the
coordination of shared vs. privileged knowledge. In fact, as recog-
nized by theory of mind researchers (e.g., Apperly, 2011; Apperly
and Butterﬁll; 2009; Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Lombardo,
2013; Low & Watts, 2013) and psycholinguists alike (e.g., Frisson
& Wakeﬁeld, 2012; Hanna et al., 2003; Keysar et al., 2003;
Schober, 1998) knowledge discrepancies often involve other kinds
of perspective differences that go beyond awareness of the exis-
tence of referents. For example, Schober (1998) outlined a number
of other factors that conversational partners need to consider to
successfully coordinate their perspectives, including time, place,
identity, and conversational agenda, among other things. Thus, in
order to understand the inferential paths that conversational part-
ners can follow to take each other’s perspective, and to develop a
complete theory of perspective taking in conversation, it is neces-
sary to study cases that reﬂect qualitatively different types of
knowledge discrepancies.
The current paper focuses on situations where knowledge dif-
ferences involve the identity ascribed to referents whose presence
and availability for reference is known to all conversational partic-
ipants. The question of how individuals manage knowledge about
object identity is of broad importance, playing a key role in various
phenomena in theoretical semantics and pragmatics as well as in
the theory of mind literature. For example, a number of language
philosophers have pointed out that terms that objectively might
refer to the same entity in a given scenario such as watch and pre-
sent cannot be straightforwardly substituted in certain contexts
without potentially creating an untrue statement (e.g., Davidson,
1984; Ludwig & Ray, 1998; Ray, 1980; Roberts, 1993). To illustrate,
the statement Tom believed that the watch looked expensive cannot
be substituted with Tom believed that the present looked expensive
in a circumstance where Tommay have had no idea that the watch
is also a present for someone. Thus, the correct linguistic encoding
of this event requires a direct consideration of Tom’s knowledge
when deciding on a relevant referring expression, which may differ
from the knowledge of the speaker or the speaker’s addressee.
These ‘‘referentially opaque’’ contexts show that successful refer-
ence involves not only a speciﬁc mapping between a term and a
corresponding entity, but also a consideration of how the identity
of the entity is or should be represented by the speaker or addres-
see (Kamawar & Olson, 1999).
In the theory of mind literature, a number of developmental
studies have suggested that perspective differences involving
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pared to cases where perspective differences involve keeping track
of which objects are occluded from another’s view. For example, at
around 14 months of age, children show evidence of understanding
that an adult should not see an object if it is blocked by an opaque
screen (Sodian, Thoermer, & Metz, 2007), or when individuals are
wearing a blindfold or have their eyes closed (Brooks & Meltzoff,
2002; Caron, Butler, & Brooks, 2002), even though the object is vis-
ible to the child. In addition, Moll and Tomasello (2006) showed
that 2-year-olds understand and adjust communicative behaviors
accordingly when another person cannot see an object that is
occluded from her/his view, even though the 2-year olds them-
selves could see that object. In contrast, the representational skills
necessary to deal with cases involving discrepancies in object iden-
tity appear to emerge later, only between 3 and 4 years of age (e.g.,
Flavell, 1988; Sapp, Lee, & Muir, 2000). In a typical task used to
assess this ability, children are ﬁrst shown a visually misleading
object (e.g., a pencil sharpener that looks like a ball) and are asked
what it looks like. The visually misleading object’s true identity is
then revealed. Finally, children are asked questions about the visu-
ally misleading object such asWhat does it look like? Does it look like
a ball or does it look like a pencil sharpener? (appearance question)
andWhat is it really really? Is it really really a ball or is it really really
a pencil sharpener? (true identity question). Flavell showed that in
such tasks 3-year-olds typically make either a ‘‘phenomenism’’
error (e.g., respond that the object looks like and really is a ball)
or an ‘‘intellectual realism’’ error (e.g., respond that it both looks
like and really is a pencil sharpener). Only at 4 years of age do chil-
dren begin to respond correctly by noting that although the object
looks like a ball, it is really a pencil sharpener. In other work,
Apperly and Robinson (1998) showed that only at around age 5
could children correctly gauge when another person would think
that a visually misleading object (e.g., a pencil sharpener that looks
like a ball) is what it looks like (e.g., a ball) rather than what it actu-
ally is (e.g., a pencil sharpener). In sum, then, developmental work
suggests that the ability to coordinate knowledge differences
related to the physical co-presence of objects develops well in
advance of the ability to manage the distinction between appear-
ance and true identity, perhaps because these two aspects of the-
ory of mind may rely on different cognitive mechanisms (e.g.,
Apperly & Butterﬁll, 2009). Of particular interest here is whether
the different patterns associated with the latter type of knowledge
discrepancy in theory of mind development are evident in
real-time referential processing in adults.
To date, experimental attempts to tap into knowledge discrep-
ancies about object identity have used a type of explicit misinfor-
mation paradigm for varying the understood identity of hidden
objects (Hanna et al., 2003; Keysar et al., 2003). For example, in
Hanna et al. (2003), Experiment 2, although two jars that were vis-
ible to the addressee but not to the speaker were empty, the exper-
imenter misinformed the speaker that one of them was ﬁlled with
olives. Furthermore, the speaker had to describe what objects she
or he believed the addressee was viewing from left to right just
before the speaker provided an instruction pertaining to one of
the objects. This procedure was meant to reinforce the addressee’s
awareness of the speaker’s false-belief about the characteristics of
the critical objects. In this context the authors found that the
addressees were able to overcome their private knowledge about
the actual properties of display objects. Thus upon hearing empty
in take the empty jar ..., addressees more strongly considered the
jar that the speaker falsely believed was the only empty jar (as
compared to a condition where the speaker was correctly informed
that both jars were empty). Nevertheless, in a situation where the
second jar did actually contain olives, addressees were overall fast-
est at identifying the target referent. The authors take these results
as evidence that, although addressees do not completely inhibittheir egocentric perspective, they are able to accommodate to the
speaker’s false-belief about an object’s identity during incremental
processing. In Keysar et al. (2003), the experimenter placed a com-
petitor object (e.g., a roll of adhesive tape) in an opaque paper bag,
covered it from the speaker’s view with an occluder panel and also
mislabeled it to the speaker both verbally and with a picture (e.g.,
in the presence of the addressee attached a picture depicting a
small leather ball on the part of the occluder that was visible to
the speaker). The target was a mutually visible object (e.g., a cas-
sette tape) whose name overlapped with the name of the actual
competitor item from the listener’s perspective. Consistent with
Hanna et al., the authors observed that addressees considered the
competitor object (e.g., adhesive tape) when hearing the tape more
than in a control condition where the competitor in the bag was
replaced with an unrelated object (e.g., a toy truck). However,
unlike Hanna et al., Keysar et al.’s design did not include a condi-
tion where the speaker’s belief would match the actual identity
of a competitor object. Thus, it remains an open question whether
a competitor in the Keysar et al. study (e.g., adhesive tape) would
be considered even more when the speaker’s belief about the com-
petitor’s identity is known by the listener to be correct compared
to when the speaker is known to have a false belief about its iden-
tity. Finally and perhaps most important, the above-mentioned
studies do not allow a direct comparison examining whether the
ability to manage identity discrepancies is different from the abil-
ity to manage existence discrepancies during incremental referen-
tial interpretation, and what the precise proﬁle of differences
might be.
1.2. Current study
The present research addresses three questions: First, are
addressees effective at managing shared vs. privileged knowledge
about object identity as initial speech sounds of referential expres-
sions are being processed? Second, are they more likely to consider
privileged information in this situation compared to the
well-studied situations where privileged knowledge involves
objects that are not known to be physically present to the speaker?
Finally, are addressees less likely to consider privileged knowledge
about object identity when the language used in prior discourse
explicitly signals a speaker’s perspective regarding a visually mis-
leading object’s identity? Instead of the kind of misinformation
paradigm used in previous studies examining identity discrepan-
cies (Hanna et al., 2003; Keysar et al., 2003) we used visually mis-
leading objects to create a situation where addressees could infer
how differing perspectives on an object’s identity would arise as
a result of the objects’ intrinsic visual features, making a misinfor-
mation intervention by the experimenter unnecessary.
Furthermore, the knowledge discrepancies in the current study
involved the semantic category to which an object belonged, and
not just a misattributed feature of an object. This brings our study
closer in line with work on theory of mind as well as the kinds of
cases of interest in theoretical semantics.
To address these questions, we conducted two experiments in
which we monitored eye movements as listeners (henceforth
addressees) participated in a referential communication task with
another individual (henceforth the speaker). In this task, the ability
to manage privileged and shared information was measured by
examining addressees’ consideration of a competitor object whose
name shared initial speech sounds with the name of a target refer-
ent (e.g., candle, given the target word candy, see Barr, 2008b, for a
similar approach). In the typical case, competitor objects attract
ﬁxations as the initial speech sounds in the target word unfold in
time. In the current experiments, however, the potential for the
competitor object’s name to overlap with the target depended, in
some conditions, on whether addressees considered their
Table 1
List of target objects and the three types of competitors used in critical trials in Experiments 1 and 2.
Target Regular phonological competitor Knowledge-based phonological competitor (looks like) Visual control object
Popcorn Potholder Potholder (record) Record
Crane Crayons Crayons (Lego) Lego
Paper bag Paperclips Paperclips (can of sardines) Can of sardines
Gnome Note block Note block (Rubik’s cube) Rubik’s cube
Scrub brush Screwdriver Screwdriver (pen) Pen
Candy Candle Candle (lightbulb) Lightbulb
Yogurt Yo-yo Yo-yo (baseball) Baseball
Tiger Timer Timer (pepper grinder) Pepper grinder
Pennies Pencils Pencils (drumsticks) Drumsticks
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tors in these cases appeared to be a different category of object
altogether, as in the case of a candle that actually looks like a light-
bulb. Thus in the absence of foreknowledge about the object’s true
identity, the speaker could not plausibly refer to this object using a
term such as candle, and the object should not attract ﬁxations as
the target word (candy) is heard. In Experiment 1, we directly com-
pared addressees’ abilities to manage knowledge discrepancies
involving the identity of objects with the more well studied situa-
tion in which discrepancies involve objects’ existence. In
Experiment 2, we investigated whether prior descriptions on the
part of the speaker that highlight her lack of knowledge about
objects’ true identity can improve addressees’ ability to manage
privileged knowledge about object identity in the earliest
moments of language processing.2. Experiment 1
Experiment 1 involved a referential communication task in
which participants took the role of addressees who followed spo-
ken instructions such as Take the candy and move it one square
down . . .. The instructions were provided by a confederate speaker
in a different room, via audiovisual conferencing software.
Addressees’ eye movements were recorded as they performed
the task.2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
The participants were 72 undergraduate students recruited
from the University of Toronto Mississauga campus community.
All participants were either native speakers of English or started
to learn English in North America from the age of 7 or earlier. An
additional three participants were excluded, either for strategically
maintaining their gaze toward the center of the display throughout
the entire experiment (n = 1), or because they reported suspecting
that the speaker was not another naïve participant during
post-experiment debrieﬁng (n = 2). Participants were paid $10
per hour or received course credit for their participation.
Participants were tested individually in a single session that lasted
approximately one hour.2.1.2. Materials and design
There were nine critical displays (see Table 1). Each critical dis-
play contained three items: the target object, the competitor
object, and an unrelated object. The experiment included a
within-participant manipulation that varied the type of competitor
object used in a given critical trial and a second, between-
participants manipulation varying the knowledge that the
addressee would attribute to the speaker.2.1.2.1. Competitor type manipulation. The competitor was varied
across three conditions (see Fig. 1). In the regular phonological com-
petitor condition, the competitor was an object (e.g., a regular can-
dle, a regular yo-yo) whose name shared onset sounds with the
target object name (e.g., ‘‘candy’’, ‘‘yogurt’’). Furthermore, the true
identity of regular phonological competitors was apparent on the
basis of their outward features (see Fig. 1, Panel A). As the target
name is heard, a competitor in this condition should attract ﬁxa-
tions because of the overlapping speech sounds with the name of
a target referent (e.g., candle, given the target word candy, see,
e.g., Allopena, Magnuson, & Tanenhaus, 1998). As in Barr (2008b),
we draw on patterns of lexical competition to index the extent to
which addressees consider privileged knowledge in the course of
processing.
A second condition used visually misleading objects (see Fig. 1,
Panel B) to serve as what we refer to as knowledge-based phonolog-
ical competitors (e.g., a candle that looks like a lightbulb, a yo-yo
that looks like a baseball). The visually misleading objects were
purchased from novelty stores and as such were items that people
might encounter in real life (and were not specially constructed for
the purposes of the experiment). These objects play a key method-
ological role because they allow addressees to easily infer and
understand how the identity ascribed to them could differ for
two different individuals. In this condition, the potential for the
visually misleading competitor object to attract ﬁxations as the
target noun unfolds (e.g., ‘‘candy’’, ‘‘yogurt’’) depends, critically, on
foreknowledge about the competitor’s true identity. In the absence
of the relevant foreknowledge, these objects would instead be cat-
egorized in terms of their appearance (e.g., as a lightbulb, a base-
ball), an outcome that was veriﬁed in a separate norming study
(see Appendix A). The absence of foreknowledge therefore elimi-
nates the overlap in the name of this competitor type with the tar-
get object’s name. However, when a knowledge-based competitor’s
true identity is known (e.g., the lightbulb-looking object is known
to be a candle or the baseball looking object is known to be a
yo-yo), the competitor gains the potential to attract visual consid-
eration as the target’s name is heard.
Finally, in the visual control condition (see Fig. 1, Panel C), the
competitor was an actual instance of the item that the visually
misleading competitor resembled (e.g., a typical lightbulb, a typical
baseball). The competitor in this condition provides a baseline con-
text where little to no visual consideration of this object should
occur. Although the competitor object was varied across the three
conditions, the target object and the unrelated object remained
unchanged.
A list design was used that cycled the pairing of competitors to
object arrays such that participants saw a given array only once.
However, across participants, each array occurred in all of the
experimental conditions. To facilitate the coding of eye move-
ments, the target object was always placed either in the top-left,
bottom-left, top-right or bottom-right compartment of the open
shelf display that was located in front of the addressee, and the
(A) (B) (C) 
Fig. 1. A regular candle (Panel A), candle that looks like a lightbulb (Panel B), and regular lightbulb (Panel C), illustrating the type of competitor manipulation common to
Experiments 1 and 2.
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the black backgrounds within display compartments represent occluder panels that allowed an object to be visible to the addressee but not to the speaker.
152 M. Mozuraitis et al. / Cognition 142 (2015) 148–165competitor object was placed in a compartment to the opposite
side. The unrelated object was placed in one of the four middle
open shelf compartments such that it was not directly beside
either the target or the competitor. The targets and competitors
were approximately 85 cm apart on any given critical trial (see
Fig. 2 for example displays).2.1.2.2. Knowledge state manipulation. The knowledge state attribu-
ted to the speaker was also manipulated across three conditions
(between participants, see Table 2 for a summary). As noted earlier,
the speaker and the addressee were located in different rooms and
communicated via audiovisual conferencing software. One third of
the participants (n = 24) were assigned to the shared-knowledge
Table 2
Knowledge state manipulation in Experiment 2.
Knowledge state condition Visual availability of competitor Awareness of knowledge-based competitor’s true identity
Shared-knowledge Both interlocutors Both interlocutors
Privileged-existence Addressee only Addressee only
Privileged-identity Both interlocutors Addressee only
M. Mozuraitis et al. / Cognition 142 (2015) 148–165 153condition. In this condition, objects were placed on the display and
named by the experimenter while the audiovisual conferencing
system was on-line (i.e., the speaker could see and hear everything
being said in the other room). This procedure therefore made it
clear to the addressee that the speaker should also know the iden-
tity of all objects, including the actual identity of visually mislead-
ing competitors. Another 24 participants were assigned to the
privileged-identity condition. In this condition, the audiovisual con-
ferencing system was off-line at the beginning of each trial while
the objects were being placed on the display and simultaneously
named by the experimenter. The system was then turned on just
before communication between the speaker and addressee began.
This is called the privileged-identity condition in view of the fact
that the addressee should consider the speaker to be unaware of
the knowledge-based competitors’ true identity on critical trials
(e.g., that the candle that looks like a lightbulb is actually a candle
or that the yo-yo that looks like a baseball is actually a yo-yo).
Nevertheless, although in this condition addressees were provided
with a cue that the speaker should be unaware of the true identity
of visually misleading objects, the true identity of any non-visually
misleading objects (including non-visually misleading competi-
tors, see Fig. 1, Panels A and C) could, of course, be correctly
inferred by the speaker from their outward appearance. The
remaining 24 participants were assigned to the privileged-
existence condition. In this condition, objects were also placed on
the display and were named for the addressee while the
audiovisual conferencing system was off-line between trials.
Furthermore, certain objects were hidden from the speaker’s per-
spective by placing opaque covers over two shelf compartments
before the audiovisual conferencing system was turned on again.
On critical trials, one cover hid the competitor object, and the other
cover hid an empty compartment. In this condition, the addressee
should believe that the speaker could not know either the identity
of the competitor or even the fact that the competitor object is on
the display. This corresponds to the existence/visual co-presence
manipulation used in a number of past studies investigating com-
mon ground effects on real-time interpretation.
In addition to the nine critical trials, there were two practice tri-
als and 15 ﬁller trials. Thirteen ﬁller trials had displays that con-
tained four objects and two ﬁller trials had displays that
contained three objects. In addition, ﬁve of the ﬁller trials had dis-
plays containing unmentioned visually misleading objects (e.g., a
laser pointer that resembled an arrowhead) that had no phonolog-
ical overlap with other objects and which were not occluded in the
privileged existence condition. Three ﬁller trials had displays con-
taining hard-to-name objects (e.g., several constructor-set pieces
attached to each other). Recall again that all objects, visually mis-
leading or not, were named for the addressee by the experimenter
as they were placed on the display (e.g., In this trial we have a candle
[in conditions involving regular and knowledge-based phonologi-
cal competitors], or a lightbulb [in conditions containing the visual
control object], a tennis ball and a candy). In addition to naming, the
feature of any visually misleading object that would give away its
identity was also demonstrated (e.g., the wick of a candle that
looks like a lightbulb, the string of a yo-yo that looks like a base-
ball). As noted earlier, a norming study (see Appendix A) conﬁrmed
objects could be readily oriented in a way that did not give awaytheir identity to the speaker. Three of the nine visually misleading
objects were oriented so that the visual feature that could give
away their identity was visible only to the addressee (e.g., the wick
of the candle that looks like a lightbulb, the tip of the screwdriver
that looks like a pen, and the tips of the pencils that look like drum-
sticks). The other six visually misleading objects were oriented in a
way that the visual feature that could give away their identity was
visible neither to the addressee nor to the speaker. The location of
the items referred to in the instructions was varied in the ﬁller tri-
als so as to break any expectations based on the patterns in the
critical trials. On 12 of the trials (6 critical and 6 ﬁller), the
ﬁrst-to-move objects occurred on the left side of the display and
on the other 12 (3 critical and 9 ﬁller) on the right side of the dis-
play. In the privileged-existence condition, 13 ﬁllers had displays
with one object covered from the speaker’s perspective (where
the objects in question were not visually misleading and had no
phonological relationship with named objects) and two ﬁllers
had displays with empty compartments covered from the speaker’s
perspective.
2.1.3. Procedure
Participants (addressees) were led to believe that the confeder-
ate speaker was another naïve participant. Upon arrival, each
addressee and the speaker (a female undergraduate student who
would always arrive a few minutes later) were seated in the same
room and asked to complete consent forms and questionnaires
regarding language background. While in the same room, they
were told that the purpose of the experiment was to investigate
how people cooperate on a collaborative task via audiovisual con-
ferencing software, and they were assigned their roles. Thus,
addressees did not know that the instructions provided by the
speaker were partly scripted.
Addressees were seated facing the shelf display and a computer
monitor with a built-in webcam connected to audiovisual confer-
encing software (see Fig. 3). The confederate speaker was then
taken to another room and was seated in front of another moni-
tor/camera running audiovisual conferencing software. The shelf
display was positioned between the addressee and the monitor/
camera, creating a situation in which the shelf display was viewed
on the speaker’s display as mirror-reversed and from the opposite
side relative to the addressee. A SONY 1/300 CCD camera was
attached to the center of the shelf display and recorded the addres-
see’s face. The experimenter (in the same room as the addressee)
then brieﬂy demonstrated the view that was available to the
speaker via the camera/monitor facing the addressee. After that,
the main task began. On each trial, the experimenter named
objects for the addressee as they were placed in the shelf display.
As noted earlier, the audiovisual conferencing program was paused
during this phase in the case of the privileged-knowledge condi-
tions. Addressees were explicitly aware of the pause phase in these
conditions because they could see the experimenter turn off the
audiovisual conferencing program and could observe that the
video window on the computer display disappeared and the audio
stream from the other room ceased. The end of the pause phase
was fully evident to addressees as well because the experimenter
had to use the conferencing software to initiate a call to the
speaker and the speaker had to answer the call to establish video
Fig. 3. Bird’s-eye view of physical arrangement of participant (addressee) and confederate speaker in Experiments 1 and 2.
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visual link was reestablished (if it had been paused), the experi-
menter gave a cue for the speaker to start her instructions. The
display was present for approximately 10 s before the speaker
started to give her instructions.
On critical trials, the ﬁrst instruction referred to the target
object, and the second referred to the unrelated object. The ﬁrst
instruction was of the form Take the [target object name] and move
it [location]. For ﬁve ﬁller trials, the instructions required the
addressee to move two objects. The remaining 10 ﬁller trials
required the addressee to move three objects. The instructions
never referred to competitor objects—visually misleading or not—
on critical trials. Furthermore, the instructions also never referred
to any visually misleading objects occurring in ﬁller trials.
Unbeknownst to the addressee, the speaker followed a partly
scripted list of instructions. However, the speaker was allowed to
improvise somewhat on non-essential parts of the instructions
when the ﬂuency of communication required or allowed for such
improvisation (e.g., when the addressee picked up an incorrect
object, the speaker corrected the addressee or paused for a longer
period of time if the addressee took a notably long time to perform
an action).2.1.4. Predictions
A comparison between the shared-knowledge and privileged-
existence conditions provides a test of whether addressees take
into account the speaker’s perspective about object exis-
tence/visual co-presence during the processing of a noun. For
example, if addressees readily integrate knowledge that the
speaker cannot see an occluded object, visual consideration of
the regular and knowledge-based phonological competitors as
well as the visual control object should be similar while hearing
the temporarily ambiguous part of the target noun in theprivileged-existence condition. However, in the shared-
knowledge condition, there should be more visual consideration
of the regular and knowledge-based phonological competitors
compared to the visual control object. This comparison will help
to inform the existing debate regarding addressees’ use of physical
co-presence cues to guide real-time referential interpretation. In
this regard, a novel aspect of the current study is the use of tar-
get–competitor pairs with phonological overlap along with live
interactive conversation.
A comparison between the shared-knowledge and privileged-
identity conditions provides the key test of whether addressees
are able to take into account the speaker’s lack of knowledge about
object identity during the interpretation of a referring expression.
For example, if addressees in the privileged identity condition
can effectively integrate knowledge about the speaker’s perspec-
tive, they should show comparatively little visual consideration
of the knowledge-based phonological competitor (e.g., a candle
that looks like a lightbulb) compared to the regular phonological
competitor (e.g., a regular candle) and to the same extent as the
visual control object (e.g., a regular lightbulb) while hearing the
temporarily ambiguous portion of the target noun (e.g., candle).
However, as mentioned above, when the actual identity of a
knowledge-based phonological competitor is mutually known
(shared-knowledge condition), addressees should show compara-
tively greater consideration of the competitor as the target noun
is heard.2.2. Results and discussion
2.2.1. Coding
Eye movements were analyzed from the video recordings using
digital playback with synchronized audio and video channels. Eye
movements were coded in 33 ms intervals (1 video frame) within
1 Although the analyses were conducted on the log odds scale, raw proportions are
presented for ease of interpretation.
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200 ms later, within which gaze patterns should not reﬂect
signal-driven noun information, see Hallett, 1986) and critical
analysis window (a 500 ms interval beginning 200 ms after noun
onset and ending 700 ms after noun onset, which should reﬂect
early referential processing arising from noun information). Eye
position was coded as reﬂecting a ﬁxation to one of the four corner
positions (where the objects of interest were located on critical tri-
als) or ‘‘other’’. Fixation position was then linked to the three object
types appearing on critical trials based on their location (target,
competitor, unrelated). Eye gaze measures within the baseline
analysis window can be expected to capture generalized scanning
patterns as well as any anticipatory consideration of display
objects before the onset of the target noun. Looking behavior
within the critical analysis window will capture eye movements
triggered by the unfolding target noun (e.g., candy).
2.2.2. Statistical modeling
Of particular interest in the current study is the extent to which
the competitor object is ﬁxated as the temporarily ambiguous part
of the target object name (e.g., candy) unfolds in time relative to
the ﬁxation pattern just before it started to unfold (the baseline).
For example, Barr (2008b) showed that people are less likely to allo-
cate visual attention to objects that are covered from speaker’s per-
spective even before the onset of critical linguistic input. In contrast,
it is reasonable to expect that the knowledge-based phonological
competitors used in the current study might attract comparatively
more visual attention before the onset of the target noun because
of their novelty. However, according to Barr (2008b), the most the-
oretically relevant measure is the change of visual attention that
takes place during the processing of the critical linguistic input
(e.g., the target noun) relative to the baseline. This is because this
measure gauges the extent to which the processing of the referential
expression reﬂects the integration of contextual information above
and beyond any biases leading up to that point. In view of this,
the data analyses are based on looks to the competitor, using a
weighted empirical logit regression that serves as an approximation
to multilevel logistic regression (Barr, Gann, & Pierce, 2011, also, see
Barr, 2008a). Importantly, the analysis window (baseline vs. critical)
is included as an additional factor in the analysis, providing an esti-
mate of the increase in the likelihood of gaze to the competitor dur-
ing the critical analysis window relative to the baseline window, as
modulated by competitor type and knowledge state.
Participants and items were treated as crossed, independent,
random effects in a linear mixed effects model implemented in
package lme4 of the statistical software R 2.15.2 (Bates,
Maechler, & Bolker, 2012; R Core Team, 2012). The overall model
included analysis window, knowledge state, competitor type and
their interactions as ﬁxed effects. Of particular interest in the con-
text of the debate regarding the effects of knowledge state on lan-
guage processing are the effects reﬂecting interactions between
analysis window and the manipulated factors (see Barr et al.,
2011). Thus, this analysis provides a ﬁner index of looking behav-
iors triggered by the relevant language stimulus, rather than by
other factors such as the prior deployment of attention to visually
salient objects. Less interesting are the terms in this model that
reﬂect main effects and interactions not involving analysis win-
dow. These terms reﬂect processing across the baseline and critical
analysis windows and as such include biases that were present
even before the onset of critical linguistic input (the target noun).
For this reason below we focus on the interactions between analy-
sis window and the manipulated factors. All other main effects and
interactions are reported in Appendix B.
The linear mixed effects model that properly converged
included random intercept, competitor type, analysis window,
and Competitor Type  Analysis Window slopes for participantsas well as random intercept, knowledge state, competitor type,
analysis window, Analysis Window  Competitor Type, and
Competitor Type  Knowledge State slopes for items.
All ﬁxed effects were evaluated by performing likelihood ratio
tests in which the deviance (2LL) of a model containing the ﬁxed
effect was compared to another model without the effect in ques-
tion but was otherwise identical in random effects structure. If
removing the ﬁxed effect caused the comparison model to fail to
converge, the model was simpliﬁed following the ‘‘best path’’ pro-
cedures (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). For the ﬁxed effects,
we report v2 as well as p values associated with the corresponding
likelihood ratio test. Graphs plotting the proportion of ﬁxations to
the competitor and target as a function of time, the type of com-
petitor, and the addressee’s knowledge state are shown in
Appendix C. Two trials (0.3%) were discarded due to experimenter
error in the placement of objects in the shelf display.2.2.3. Eye movement data
Fig. 4 plots the increase in likelihood of gaze to the competitor
across the analysis window, knowledge state and competitor type
conditions.1 Table 3 presents the summary of the interactions
between the analysis window and manipulated factors, as well as
follow-up comparisons.
The mixed effects model revealed that there was no main effect
of analysis window (p = 0.178), which indicates that visual consid-
eration of the objects did not differ signiﬁcantly between baseline
and critical analysis windows when collapsing across all knowl-
edge states and different types of competitors. However, there
was a signiﬁcant Analysis Window  Knowledge State interaction,
v2(2) = 11.98, p = 0.003. The follow up comparisons revealed that
for the shared-knowledge and privileged-identity conditions, the
likelihood of gaze to the competitor signiﬁcantly increased in the
critical analysis window relative to the baseline (0.16 vs. 0.07,
v2(1) = 8.95, p = 0.003, and 0.17 vs. 0.11, v2(1) = 8.77, p = 0.003,
respectively). However, for the privileged-existence condition,
the likelihood of gaze to the competitor was not signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent across the baseline and critical analysis windows (0.02 vs.
0.05, p = 0.672). In other words, when the competitor objects were
occluded from the speaker’s view, unfolding linguistic input did
not trigger signiﬁcantly more looks to these objects. In contrast,
when the competitor objects were visible to both an addressee
and the speaker, the unfolding noun did shift addressees’ visual
attention to these objects.
The results also revealed a signiﬁcant Analysis Window 
Competitor Type interaction, v2(2) = 9.61, p = 0.008. Follow-up
pairwise comparisons revealed that, in the condition with regular
phonological competitors, the likelihood of gaze to the competitor
marginally increased in the critical analysis window relative to
the baseline across knowledge state conditions (0.16 vs. 0.04,
v2(1) = 3.13, p = 0.077). In addition, in the condition with
knowledge-based phonological competitors, the likelihood of gaze
to the competitor signiﬁcantly increased in the critical analysis
window relative to the baseline (0.15 vs. 0.08, v2(1) = 6.66,
p = 0.010). However, when competitors were visual control objects,
the likelihood of gaze to the competitor was not different between
the baseline and critical analysis windows (0.07 vs. 0.06, p = 0.359).
Thus there is overall less visual consideration of the competitor
when the competitor is a visual control object. The contrast
between the visual control and regular phonological competitor
conditions is not unexpected because in the former condition there
is no match between the sounds in the unfolding target object
name and the name for this object. More interesting is that the
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Fig. 4. Likelihood of gaze to the competitor as a function of analysis window, the type of competitor object and addressee’s knowledge state regarding the objects relative to
the speaker, Experiment 1. Note: although the analyses were conducted on the log odds scale, raw proportions are presented for ease of interpretation.
Table 3
Interactions between the analysis window and manipulated factors (knowledge state and competitor type) as well as follow up comparisons conducted in Experiment 1.
Effect Gaze likelihood within
analysis window
v2 p
Baseline Critical
Analysis Window 0.06 0.12 1.82 0.178
Analysis Window  Knowledge State 11.98 0.003
Baseline vs. critical analysis window within shared-knowledge condition 0.07 0.16 8.95 0.003
Baseline vs. critical analysis window within privileged-existence condition 0.02 0.05 0.18 0.672
Baseline vs. critical analysis window within privileged-identity condition 0.11 0.17 8.77 0.003
Analysis Window  Competitor Type 9.61 0.008
Baseline vs. critical analysis window for regular phonological competitor 0.04 0.16 3.13 0.077
Baseline vs. critical analysis window for knowledge-based phonological competitor 0.08 0.15 6.66 0.010
Baseline vs. critical analysis window for visual control object 0.07 0.06 0.84 0.359
Analysis Window  Competitor Type  Knowledge State 6.18 0.186
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knowledge-based phonological competitors in the context of this
interaction. This outcome suggests that addressees were consistent
in the use of their knowledge about object identity (whether it was
privileged or not) across the knowledge state conditions.
2.2.3.1. Listeners’ ability to manage privileged knowledge about object
existence. Although the interaction between analysis window,
knowledge state and competitor type was not signiﬁcant in the
overall model, p = 0.186, in view of the observed patterns, and to
increase the power, we used two additional linear mixed effects
models to test our speciﬁc predictions concerning the extent to
which the regular and knowledge-based phonological competitors
were considered relative to the visual control object across the dif-
ferent knowledge state conditions. The ﬁrst model compared pro-
cessing within the shared-knowledge and privileged-existence
conditions. This provides a statistical test of the extent to which
incoming noun information leads the listener to consider privi-
leged knowledge of an object that is not visible to the speaker
(as has often been explored in past studies). In the shared-
knowledge condition, there should be a larger increase in competi-
tor ﬁxations as the target noun unfolds relative to the baseline
window for the regular and knowledge-based phonological com-
petitors compared to the visual control object. In the
privileged-existence condition, if addressees can readily integrate
knowledge that the speaker cannot see an occluded object, com-
petitor ﬁxations should show a different pattern across analysis
windows. Speciﬁcally, ﬁxation patterns for the visual control object
should be more similar to those for the regular and
knowledge-based phonological competitors in this condition.
The model testing the above prediction regarding different pro-
cessing patterns of the competitor objects within shared-
knowledge and privileged-existence conditions included analysiswindow (baseline vs. critical), knowledge state (shared knowledge
vs. privileged existence) and competitor type (regular phonological
competitor, knowledge-based phonological competitor, visual con-
trol object) and their interactions as ﬁxed effects. In addition, the
model included the maximal random effects structure supported
by the experimental design. Below we report only the interaction
between analysis window, knowledge state, and competitor type
because it is most relevant for testing our predictions. Table 4 pre-
sents the summary of this three-way interaction, as well as follow
up comparisons.
To begin, the Analysis Window Knowledge State  Competitor
Type interaction was marginally signiﬁcant, v2(2) = 5.33, p = 0.069.
Follow-up pairwise comparisons revealed that in the shared knowl-
edge condition, consideration of both regular and knowledge-based
phonological competitors signiﬁcantly increased in the critical anal-
ysis window relative to the baseline (0.19 vs. 0.06, v2(1) = 8.98,
p = 0.003 and 0.20 vs. 0.05, v2(1) = 4.52, p = 0.034) but not with
the visual control object (0.07 vs. 0.10, p = 0.281). However, in the
privileged-existence condition, competitor consideration did not
increase in the critical analysis window relative to the baseline for
either the regular phonological competitor (0.06 vs. 0.01,
p = 0.498), the knowledge-based phonological competitor (0.06 vs.
0.03, p = 0.327), or the visual control object (0.03 vs. 0.01,
p = 0.130). This outcome is consistent with previous ﬁndings show-
ing that a listeners’ sensitivity to the shared vs. privileged status of
objects in terms of their existence/physical co-presence is evident in
the earliest moments of referential comprehension (e.g., Brown-
Schmidt et al., 2008; Hanna et al., 2003; Heller et al., 2008). In the
current study, the contrast between the shared-knowledge and
privileged-existence conditions resembles the kind of physical
co-presence manipulations used in those studies, although the
speaker’s perception of the physical scene was mediated by com-
puter in the current case.
Table 4
Interaction between the analysis window, knowledge state and competitor type as well as follow-up comparisons to test predictions regarding processing of different types of
competitors within shared-knowledge and privileged-existence conditions, Experiment 1.
Effect Gaze likelihood within
analysis window
v2 p
Baseline Critical
Analysis Window  Knowledge State  Competitor Type 5.33 0.069
Shared-knowledge
Baseline vs. critical analysis window for regular phonological competitor 0.05 0.20 4.52 0.034
Baseline vs. critical analysis window for knowledge-based phonological competitor 0.06 0.19 8.98 0.003
Baseline vs. critical analysis window for visual control object 0.10 0.07 1.16 0.281
Privileged-existence
Baseline vs. critical analysis window for regular phonological competitor 0.01 0.06 0.46 0.498
Baseline vs. critical analysis window for knowledge-based phonological competitor 0.03 0.06 0.96 0.327
Baseline vs. critical analysis window for visual control object 0.01 0.03 2.29 0.130
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identity. A second model compared processing within the
shared-knowledge and privileged-identity conditions. As men-
tioned above, in the shared-knowledge condition, there should be
a larger increase in competitor ﬁxations as the target noun unfolds
relative to the baseline window for the regular and
knowledge-based phonological competitors compared to the
visual control object. In the privileged-identity condition, if addres-
sees readily integrate knowledge that the speaker does not know
the true identity of a visually misleading object, there should be
a larger increase in competitor ﬁxations for the regular phonolog-
ical competitor compared to the knowledge-based phonological
competitor and the visual control object. In addition, competitor
ﬁxations should show a pattern across analysis windows that is
similar for the knowledge-based phonological competitor and the
visual control object. The model testing this prediction included
analysis window (baseline vs. critical), knowledge state (shared
knowledge vs. privileged identity) and competitor type (regular
phonological competitor, knowledge-based phonological competi-
tor, visual control object) and their interactions as ﬁxed effects. In
addition, the model included the maximal random effects structure
supported by the experimental design.
The Analysis Window  Knowledge State  Competitor Type
interaction in this model was not signiﬁcant, p = 0.545, reﬂecting
the fact that the pattern of visual consideration of competitor
objects is extremely similar in the shared-knowledge and
privileged-identity conditions. In other words, the above analysis
conﬁrmed that addressees were consistent in the use of their
knowledge about object identity across the two knowledge state
conditions despite the fact that in the privileged-identity condition
this knowledge was privileged.2.2.3.3. Summary. Of greatest interest here is the ﬁnding that the
pattern of visual consideration for the competitor object in the
privileged-identity condition was in fact most similar to the one
observed in the shared-knowledge condition. Recall that
knowledge-based competitor objects should not in fact reﬂect
phonological competition in this condition if addressees were
effectively integrating the knowledge that should be attributed to
the speaker. The fact that these objects were considered to the
extent observed here therefore suggests that addressees may tend
to consider privileged knowledge about object identity to a rather
strong degree in the early moments of processing. This clearly con-
trasts with addressees’ demonstrated ability to manage knowledge
discrepancies involving objects’ existence in the context (using
physical co-presence cues), as illustrated in both the current exper-
iment and earlier studies (Brown-Schmidt et al., 2008; Hanna et al.,
2003; Heller et al., 2008).One possible explanation for addressees’ observed performance
in the privileged-identity condition could be that addressees did
not have enough information to strongly infer the speaker’s igno-
rance regarding the identity of the visually misleading objects. By
contrast, in the privileged-existence condition, the opaque covers
placed on the shelf display provide a comparatively salient and
high-quality cue regarding the speaker’s knowledge of the physical
context. It is therefore possible that addressees’ performance when
faced with identity discrepancies would be boosted if they had
additional cues to reinforce the speaker’s knowledge state. One rel-
evant cue explored in a number of previous studies involves the
way in which objects whose existence has been established via lin-
guistic mention are efﬁciently recognized as constituting ‘‘shared
information’’ (in common ground) by addressees, regardless of
whether their shared status is reﬂected in the physical context
(Brown-Schmidt, 2009; Brown-Schmidt, 2012; Brown-Schmidt
et al., 2008; Hanna et al., 2003). For example, Brown-Schmidt
(2012) showed that addressees were more likely to consider a
game-piece hidden to the speaker as a potential referent if that
particular game-piece had been mentioned during previous con-
versational interaction. In the ﬁnal experiment we draw on a sim-
ilar linguistic context manipulation to examine whether stronger
cues regarding the speaker’s knowledge state may inﬂuence
addressee’s ability to manage privileged information about object
identity.3. Experiment 2
According to Clark and Marshall (1978), information mentioned
in a discourse becomes a part of the mutually shared information
in the communicative context and, as noted above, the effects of
this information on real-time processing are well established (see
also Clark & Marshall, 1981). In the current experiment, we exam-
ine whether previous descriptions produced by the speaker that
reinforce the speaker’s lack of knowledge about an object’s true
identity facilitate addressees’ ability to track the speaker’s knowl-
edge state.
Similar to Experiment 1, participants in Experiment 2 were
assigned the role of addressee and followed instructions from a
confederate speaker in a different room via an audiovisual confer-
encing program. The communicative scenario involved the
privileged-identity condition from Experiment 1, where the iden-
tity of the objects (including knowledge-based phonological com-
petitors) was revealed only to the addressee before each trial
while the audiovisual conferencing system was turned off (the
shared-knowledge and privileged-existence conditions in
Experiment 1 were not used in Experiment 2). As before, we varied
the type of competitor that appeared in the critical trials.
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(e.g., a regular candle) for the target name (e.g., candy), a
knowledge-based phonological competitor (e.g., a candle that
looks like a lightbulb), or a phonologically unrelated visual control
object (e.g., a genuine lightbulb). This manipulation was crossed
with a linguistic context manipulation. This manipulation varied
whether the confederate speaker referred to the competitor object
when it occurred in what we refer to as a ‘‘context trial’’ occurring
two trials before the corresponding critical trial. In the
prior-mention condition, the context trial involved the speaker
naming the competitor object in the course of describing the
intended location for a different display object (e.g., Pick up the
ﬂower and put it above the lightbulb). Critically, for the visually mis-
leading objects used as knowledge-based phonological competi-
tors, the confederate speaker provided names based on the
objects’ outward appearance (e.g., the lightbulb for a candle that
looks like a lightbulb). Thus, the name reﬂected the speaker’s lack
of knowledge about the true identity of the visually misleading
object. In the no-prior-mention condition, the speaker did not refer
to the competitor object in the context trials, although the action
being communicated was the same (e.g., Pick up the ﬂower and
put it one square to the left). The verbal instructions and object lay-
outs for critical trials were the same as in Experiment 1.
If an earlier description used by the speaker can help support an
addressee’s ability to consider the speaker’s perspective regarding
the identity of an object, then upon hearing a target object name
(e.g., candle), addressees should show less visual consideration of
a knowledge-based phonological competitor (e.g., a candle that
looks like a lightbulb) in the prior-mention condition where the
speaker will have previously referred to the visually misleading
object based on its appearance (e.g., the lightbulb for a candle that
looks like a lightbulb), compared to the no-prior-mention condi-
tion. Furthermore, the regular phonological competitor (e.g., a reg-
ular candle) and the visual control object (e.g., a genuine lightbulb)
should show high and low amounts of visual consideration, respec-
tively, regardless of previous mention because their true identity is
congruent with their appearance. (In these conditions, the label
provided during the context trials reﬂected the competitor object’s
true identity.)3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
The participants were 48 undergraduate students recruited
from the University of Toronto Mississauga campus community.
All participants were either native speakers of English or started
to use English by age 7. An additional nine participants were
excluded, either for strategically maintaining their gaze toward
the center of the display throughout the entire experiment
(n = 2), equipment problems (n = 5), because they reported sus-
pecting that the speaker was not another naïve participant during
the post-experiment debrieﬁng procedure (n = 1), or because they
reported noticing that some of the objects had names with over-
lapping initial sounds (n = 1). Participants were paid $10 per hour
or received course credit for their participation. Participants were
tested individually in one session that lasted approximately one
hour.3.1.2. Materials and design
The competitor type manipulation was identical to the one used
in Experiment 1. In the current experiment, knowledge about the
true identity of the visually misleading object was always privi-
leged to addressees (i.e., as in the privileged-identity condition in
Experiment 1); that is, objects were always placed on the shelf dis-
play and named only to the addressees while the audiovisualconferencing system was off-line. Thus, the addressee should
expect the speaker to be unaware of a knowledge-based competi-
tor’s true identity (e.g., the speaker should not know that a candle
that looks like a lightbulb is actually a candle). Furthermore, as
described above, we included a linguistic context manipulation
in which the competitor object occurred in a display two trials ear-
lier than the corresponding critical trial (see Fig. 5 for an example
of the trial sequence). In the prior-mention condition, one of the
instructions in these context trials involved reference to the even-
tual competitor object (including knowledge-based phonological
competitors), using a description that reﬂected the object’s appear-
ance. In the no-prior-mention condition, the speaker did not refer to
the competitor objects in the context trials at all. The
no-prior-mention condition therefore resembled the
privileged-existence condition in Experiment 1, where the addres-
see infers the speaker’s knowledge state based only on the assump-
tion that the speaker will categorize a visually misleading object
based on its appearance. On critical trials, the instructions provided
by the speaker were identical to those in Experiment 1.
In addition to the nine critical trials and nine context trials,
there were two practice trials and 15 ﬁller trials were included
to avoid contingencies that might bias addressees towards the tar-
get in the critical trials. Out of 33 trials in total, 11 had all-new
objects and 22 (nine critical and 13 ﬁller/context trials) had objects
that appeared in previous trials. Eleven of the objects that
appeared in previous trials (all ﬁller and context trials) were
objects that had to be moved on their second occurrence, whereas
11 were not moved in either trial (nine on critical trials and two in
ﬁller/context trials). Furthermore, on 16 trials (six critical and 10
ﬁller/context) the ﬁrst object to be moved was on the left side of
the display and on another 17 trials (three critical and 14 ﬁller/con-
text) it was on the right side of the display. In addition, 16 trials
(nine critical and seven ﬁller/context) had displays that contained
three objects and 17 trials (all ﬁllers/context trials) had displays
that contained four objects. Finally, seven ﬁller trials and context
trials had displays containing hard-to-name objects (e.g., several
constructor-set pieces attached to each other).3.1.3. Procedure
The procedure was analogous to the privileged-identity condi-
tion in Experiment 1, where the experimenter always turned the
audiovisual conferencing system off before placing objects on the
display and naming them to the addressee.3.2. Results and discussion
3.2.1. Coding
Coding procedures were as in Experiment 1. A total of 2.5% of
trials were excluded because of experimenter error while placing
the objects on the display or equipment failure (no sound
recorded).3.2.2. Statistical modeling
Statistical modeling was conducted in the same way as in
Experiment 1. Analysis window, linguistic context, competitor type
and their interactions were entered as ﬁxed effects into the linear
mixed effects model. The model that properly converged included
random intercept, random slopes for analysis window, competitor
type, and Analysis Window  Competitor type for participants as
well as random intercept, random slopes for analysis window, lin-
guistic context, competitor type and all of their interactions for
items. As for Experiment 1, the main effects and interactions not
involving analysis window are reported in Appendix B.
Fig. 5. Example sequence of context and critical trials with knowledge-based competitor object and corresponding instructions in Experiment 2.
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Fig. 6. Likelihood of gaze to the competitor as a function of analysis window, the type of competitor object and linguistic context, Experiment 2. Note: although the analyses
were conducted on the log odds scale, raw proportions are presented for ease of interpretation.
Table 5
Interactions between the analysis window, competitor type, linguistic context as well as follow up comparisons conducted in Experiment 2.
Effect Gaze likelihood within
analysis window
v2 p
Baseline Critical
Analysis Window 0.11 0.16 6.10 0.013
Analysis Window  Linguistic Context 0.25 0.615
Analysis Window  Competitor Type 6.65 0.036
Baseline vs. critical analysis window for regular phonological competitor 0.11 0.21 7.97 0.005
Baseline vs. critical analysis window for knowledge-based phonological competitor 0.14 0.20 8.91 0.003
Baseline vs. critical analysis window for visual control object 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.797
Analysis Window  Linguistic Context  Competitor Type 1.31 0.520
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Fig. 6 plots competitor ﬁxations across the analysis window, lin-
guistic context and competitor type conditions. Table 5 presents
the summary of the main effects and interactions tested by the
model as well as the follow up comparisons conducted in
Experiment 2. The proportion of ﬁxations to the competitor and
target as a function of time, the type of competitor and linguistic
context are shown in Appendix D.As in Experiment 1, of most interest is how competitor ﬁxations
changed from the baseline window to the critical analysis window
as a function of linguistic context and competitor type. The model
revealed a signiﬁcant main effect of analysis window (v2(1) = 6.10,
p = 0.013). This effect reﬂects the fact that overall participants were
less likely to ﬁxate the competitor objects during the baseline
(likelihood = 0.11) rather than critical (likelihood = 0.16) analysis
window. This was qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant Analysis
160 M. Mozuraitis et al. / Cognition 142 (2015) 148–165Window  Competitor Type interaction, v2(2) = 6.65, p = 0.036.
Follow-up pairwise comparisons revealed that, for regular phono-
logical competitors and knowledge-based phonological competi-
tors, the likelihood of ﬁxating the competitor signiﬁcantly
increased in the critical analysis window relative to the baseline
(0.21 vs. 0.11, v2(1) = 7.97, p = 0.005, and 0.20 vs. 0.14,
v2(1) = 8.91, p = 0.003, respectively). However, for visual control
objects, they did not attract more ﬁxations in the critical analysis
window relative to the baseline window (0.09 vs. 0.08, p = 0.797).
Thus the unfolding target noun triggered consideration of the com-
petitor only when the competitor was a regular phonological com-
petitor or knowledge-based phonological competitor and not when
the competitor was a visual control object. The lack of a signiﬁcant
interaction between analysis window and linguistic context,
p = 0.615, or an interaction between analysis window, competitor
type and linguistic context, p = 0.520, suggests that this pattern
was consistent across the no-prior-mention and prior-mention
conditions.
The results of Experiment 2 suggest that addressees strongly
considered their own privileged knowledge about the competitor’s
identity as the ambiguous part of the target object name was
heard, even when they had supplementary linguistic cues high-
lighting that the speaker was unaware of the knowledge-based
competitor’s true identity. Addressees’ consideration of the com-
petitor object in the condition with knowledge-based competitors
was the same as what was observed with regular phonological
competitors despite the fact that the speaker had previously
referred to the visually misleading competitor object on the basis
of its appearance (e.g., the lightbulb for the candle that looks like
a lightbulb). Thus, supportive linguistic information that explicitly
signals the speaker’s knowledge state regarding the identity of the
visually misleading objects did not change addressees’ tendency to
consider their privileged knowledge about these objects’ identity.4. General discussion
Our goals in the present study were to investigate how addres-
sees in conversation manage privileged knowledge about the iden-
tity of objects in the earliest moments of language processing, and
to directly compare this to cases involving knowledge about the
existence/presence of objects. In two experiments, we monitored
eye movements as addressees followed a confederate speaker’s
instructions in a conversational context in which visually mislead-
ing objects served as competitor items in displays where another
object served as the target (e.g., candy).
In Experiment 1, we found that, when the competitor objects
were occluded from the speaker’s view, addressees were measur-
ably less likely to visually consider these objects upon hearing
the target name than when they were visible to both an addressee
and the speaker. This is consistent with previous ﬁndings showing
that the shared vs. privileged status of objects in terms of their
existence/physical co-presence is evident in the earliest moments
of referential processing (e.g., Brown-Schmidt et al., 2008; Hanna
et al., 2003; Heller et al., 2008). Furthermore, in contrast to Barr
(2008b) who also used a lexical competition paradigm to explore
co-presence effects, the current results suggest that listeners’ sen-
sitivity to another person’s perspective can in fact inﬂuence com-
prehension as individual speech sounds are mapped to noun
candidates. In a computer-based interaction task, Barr (2008b)
found that when the target name (e.g., ‘‘buckle’’) was heard, the
proportion of ﬁxations to a phonological competitor (e.g., a bucket)
initially increased at the same rate as target ﬁxations regardless of
whether the competitor was in privileged or common ground
(which was signaled by the color of a background square accompa-
nying the image of the competitor). In the current experiment,however, the increase in competitor ﬁxations during the unfolding
target noun relative to the baseline was signiﬁcantly higher with
regular and knowledge-based phonological competitors compared
to visual control objects when they were visible to both interlocu-
tors but the increase was not signiﬁcant when they were covered
from the speaker’s perspective. Nevertheless, the fact that, in the
overall model, the three-way interaction between the analysis
window, knowledge state, and competitor type was only approach-
ing signiﬁcance suggests that the regular and knowledge-based
phonological competitors might not be completely suppressed
even when they were covered from the speaker’s perspective—a
pattern that is somewhat evident in the data. These mild
bottom-up effects arising from phonological overlap are in fact
not speciﬁc to situations involving visual cues to common ground
but occur even when strong and local linguistic constraints (sen-
tential semantics and, in bilingual contexts, the currently relevant
language) are incongruent with the ‘‘intruding’’ lexical competitors
in visual world studies (cf. Chambers & Cooke, 2009; Dahan &
Tanenhaus, 2004).
One possible explanation for why listeners’ early sensitivity to
the shared vs. privileged status of objects in terms of their exis-
tence/physical co-presence was evident in the current study but
not in Barr (2008b) rests on differences in the methodology used
in the two studies. Barr (2008b) presented stimuli on a computer
screen whereas in the current study addressees interacted with
real objects. In addition, Barr (2008b) used pre-recorded instruc-
tions, whereas the current study involved a live speaker located
in a different room. As suggested by Brennan and Hanna (2009),
the use of a live speaker and only partially scripted instructions
may have enriched the interaction and strengthened the potential
to detect partner-speciﬁc effects because they increase the utility
of taking the speaker’s perspective.
Importantly, addressees’ ability to successfully manage privi-
leged knowledge about the existence of entities in Experiment 1
contrasted with their performance when knowledge about entities’
identity was at issue. Indeed, the most striking ﬁnding from
Experiment 1 was that listeners considered privileged knowledge
about the identity of objects in the course of incrementally map-
ping nouns to referential candidates. The extent to which privi-
leged knowledge was considered did not differ from a situation
where this identity knowledge was shared between conversational
participants.
In Experiment 2, we investigated whether the confederate
speaker’s prior use of descriptions that highlighted her lack of
knowledge about the visually misleading objects’ true identities
would reduce an addressee’s tendency to consider privileged
knowledge in the early moments of processing. Surprisingly, the
results showed a pattern that was similar to the one found in
Experiment 1: Even when the speaker had previously referred to
a visually misleading object on a basis of its outward appear-
ance—thereby reinforcing her understanding of the object’s iden-
tity—addressees still showed evidence of using privileged
knowledge about object identity during referential interpretation.
It is important to point out, however, that the current data do
not suggest that taking other’s perspective regarding object iden-
tity is impossible. As suggested by a number of researchers
(Brennan & Clark, 1996; Brown-Schmidt, 2012; Clark & Brennan,
1989), establishing common ground in some cases may require a
substantial amount of collaboration and interaction between the
conversational partners. For example, Brennan and Clark (1996)
showed that it required several turns to establish mutually agreed
upon conceptualization of ambiguous ﬁgures and to use these con-
ceptualizations in subsequent communication. In addition,
Brown-Schmidt (2012) suggested that listeners’ sensitivity to
other’s knowledge was somewhat moderated by the way the exis-
tence of occluded objects was revealed to them and by the type of
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positive and/or negative evidence regarding the knowledge state
of the speaker is required to reduce listeners’ consideration of
privileged knowledge about the identity of objects in the course
of incrementally mapping nouns to referential candidates.
Nevertheless, the results of Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that the
bias to take into account privileged knowledge regarding objects’
identity is comparatively strong and is not easily shifted by cues
that have been shown to support perspective-taking abilities in
studies where knowledge discrepancies involve the existence/
physical co-presence of referential objects.
Why do addressees consistently consider privileged knowledge
about an object’s identity as a referring expression unfolds? One
possible explanation involves the salience of the perceptually mis-
leading objects used in the current study. In particular, the novelty
items used as stimuli are quite striking in terms of the gap between
what they look like and what they really are. It is possible that once
an individual recognizes that a visually misleading object is some-
thing very different from what it appears to be, it becomes interest-
ing at some level to think about the contrast with its true identity.
Thus, the acquired knowledge about an object’s true identity might
not be effectively inhibited, even when the communicative context
suggests that the conversational partner does not possess this
knowledge. According to this explanation, it would follow that
materials involving less striking appearance-identity discrepancies
might lead to a different pattern of performance on the part of
addressees (e.g., a wrapped present that the speaker believes is a gift
for person A whereas the addressee knows it is intended for person
B). On the other hand, this line of argument cannot explain the ﬁnd-
ing that participants in Experiment 1 did not have any trouble
avoiding the consideration of visually misleading objects when
these objects were covered from the speaker’s view.
Another explanation for the observed differences between the
existence and identity cases appeals to differences in the represen-
tational demands required to resolve the respective types of
knowledge discrepancies. Namely, in the existence cases, the
addressee’s task is to simply suppress an entity from a set of pos-
sible referents. This may be a comparatively easy task in terms of
mental representation because the occluded object is recognized
as not being ‘‘perceived’’ by the speaker and, in turn, can be
straightforwardly indexed as irrelevant or outside the currently
relevant referential domain of interpretation (see, e.g., Brennan &
Hanna, 2009). However, in the identity cases studied here, the
range of referential candidates is the same in each case, and the
task for the addressee is to make an inference about the way in
which the speaker perceives and categorizes elements in the set.
The perception (and assigned category) of a given object, in turn,
restricts only the relevance of particular labels for referential com-
munication. In other words, in identity cases, the addressee needs
to make an inference about the possible ways in which the speaker
can talk about objects rather than whether he or she can talk about
them at all. Thus, the knowledge discrepancies in identity cases
involve selected subtypes of information associated with the refer-
ents rather than the referents as a whole. Indeed, the cognitive
development literature suggests that tasks requiring an apprecia-
tion of knowledge discrepancies related to selected features of ref-
erents are comparatively difﬁcult for children (Apperly & Robinson,
1998; Apperly & Robinson, 2003; Hulme, Mitchell, & Wood, 2003;
Sprung, Perner, & Mitchell, 2007). Apperly and Butterﬁll (2009)
have suggested that a similar contrast is found in adult cognition
(see also Low &Watts, 2013). In particular, they claim that the abil-
ity of an adult to track other adults’ beliefs about objects they have
not seen or are unaware of is rather automatic and quite efﬁcient.
In contrast, reasoning about others’ beliefs that involve complex
combinations of properties and modes of presentation is effortful
and cognitively demanding.A related explanation for addressees’ tendency to consider priv-
ileged knowledge about an object’s true identity appeals to the
notion of psychological essentialism. Psychological essentialism
involves the idea that most ontological categories (e.g., ‘insect’)
have some stable underlying reality (Gelman, 2004). Once this
reality is established for an entity, altering its superﬁcial appear-
ance (e.g., making an insect perceptually similar to a leaf) does
not remove its essence in the mind of an individual (Gelman &
Markman, 1986; Gelman & Wellman, 1991; Keil, 1989). For exam-
ple, children draw inferences about objects based on their essence
even when it competes with their perceptual features (Gelman &
Markman, 1986; Gelman & Wellman, 1991). Thus, it is possible
that the patterns observed in the current study reﬂect a robust
essentialist bias in the way that mental representations for visually
perceived objects are constructed and maintained in working
memory. This explanation is consistent with data reported by
Frisson and Wakeﬁeld (2012) from a study of narrative compre-
hension. In their study, participants read a series of stories in
which animals were superﬁcially transformed into other animals
(e.g., a donkey was transformed into a zebra by painting stripes
on its back). When after the transformation the narrator referred
to the animal using a term reﬂecting its true identity (e.g., the don-
key) participants read the term faster than when it was reﬂecting
the animal’s appearance (e.g., the zebra). However, reading times
for the two types of terms did not differ when they were embedded
into a direct discourse of a story character who was naïve to the
transformation (e.g., the naïve story character is described as being
unaware that the zebra looking animal is actually a donkey). If
readers were sensitive to the story character’s unawareness about
the transformation, one would expect them to read the term
reﬂecting the animal’s appearance (e.g., the zebra) faster than when
it is reﬂecting its true identity (e.g., the donkey). In other words,
Frisson and Wakeﬁeld showed a bias towards psychological essen-
tialism as well as a failure to integrate a naïve character’s perspec-
tive about the animal’s identity in real-time narrative
comprehension. A psychological essentialism explanation is also
consistent with Hanna et al.’s (2003) ﬁndings showing that addres-
sees successfully draw on a speaker’s perspective during referen-
tial processing when the speaker’s false belief involved only
features of objects that were not central to its identity or capacity
to serve a situationally-required function (e.g., when the speaker
correctly believed there were two hidden jars but falsely believed
that one of them contained olives). It is possible that perspective
differences that do not involve non-essential features of object
identity are easier to overcome than the ones involving discrepan-
cies involving an object’s core identity. It also remains an open
question to what extent the more effective suppression of privi-
leged knowledge observed by Hanna et al. would occur if the
speaker’s false belief had been inferred from the situational context
rather than through explicit misinformation provided by an
experimenter.
More generally, the issues noted above raise the question of
whether full suppression of privileged knowledge about identity
would be adaptive or possible, even in a context where a strategy
of ignoring one’s own knowledge would arguably serve to increase
efﬁciency in reference resolution. For this reason, we have been
careful to avoid describing listeners’ use of privileged information
as reﬂecting ‘‘difﬁculty’’ in perspective taking, and instead prefer to
highlight a need for future research to clarify the value and func-
tion of privileged identity information in interactive conversation.
On this note, it is important to acknowledge that efﬁcient
perspective-taking in linguistic reference cannot be reduced to a
heuristic of considering only the information shared with an inter-
locutor but also involves a consideration of privileged knowledge
in some contexts (Brown-Schmidt et al., 2008) and, more generally,
is likely to involve a sophisticated process of balancing and
162 M. Mozuraitis et al. / Cognition 142 (2015) 148–165integrating privileged and shared information (Heller et al., 2008).
We suggest that discrepancies in identity knowledge may provide
a particularly useful testing ground for exploring these ideas in
greater detail.
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Appendix A
A.1. Norming experiment
The goal of the norming experiment was to conﬁrm that, when
the true identity of visually misleading objects used in
Experiments 1 and 2 is not known, they will be identiﬁed and
named in terms of their outward appearance. Participants were
30 undergraduate students recruited from the University of
Toronto Mississauga community who did not participate in
Experiment 1 or 2. All participants were either native speakers of
English or started to learn English in North America from the age
of 7 or earlier. An additional two participants were excluded
because of experimenter error during the presentation of stimuli.
Participants were paid $5 per half hour or received course credit
for their participation. Participants were tested individually in
one session lasting approximately 30 min.
A.1.1. Method
On each trial, an object was placed alone in a compartment of
the shelf display also used in Experiments 1 and 2, and participants
(seated at the same distance as those in the main experiments)
were asked to name the object. There were nine critical trials,
and the nature of the object that was presented was manipulated
across three conditions by varying the speciﬁc ‘‘version’’ of the
object that was shown. In the visually misleading object condition,
the object’s outward appearance was misleading (e.g., a candle that
looks like a lightbulb or a yo-yo that looks like a baseball, see Fig. 1,
Panel B for an example). The visually misleading objects were posi-
tioned such that any perceptual features that could reveal their
true identity were hidden due to the physical orientation of the
object on the shelf. For example, in the case of the candle that looks
like a lightbulb and the yo-yo that looks like a baseball, the wick
and the string were not visible when the objects were placed on
the shelf. For this reason the objects were placed on the shelf in
the same orientation as they were seen by the speaker in
Experiments 1 and 2. In the identity-matched object condition, the
objects belonged to the same category as the corresponding visu-
ally misleading object but their outward appearance made them
straightforwardly identiﬁable (e.g., a prototypical candle or a pro-
totypical yo-yo, see Panel A). In the appearance-matched object con-
dition, the objects to be named had the same perceptual features as
the corresponding visually misleading object but in this case their
identity matched their appearance (e.g., a genuine lightbulb or a
genuine baseball, see Panel C). The type of object manipulation
in the norming experiment therefore closely matched the type of
competitor manipulation used in Experiments 1 and 2. The pairing
of objects to conditions was cycled across participants through the
use of three presentation lists. Each participant saw only one of the
three versions of each critical object, but across participants, each
critical object occurred in all experimental conditions.
Critical trials were intermixed with 15 ﬁller trials, 10 of which
involved objects that were difﬁcult to name (e.g., a component of
a bicycle gear shifter) and ﬁve of which involved comparatively
easy-to-name objects (e.g., a glass).A.1.2. Results
Because the goal of the norming experiment was to conﬁrm
that participants could not recognize the true identity of the visu-
ally misleading objects based on their outward appearance, the
names provided for the critical objects by the participants were
coded based on whether they reﬂected actual identity of the
objects or not. For example, given a candle that looked like a light-
bulb, responses such as the candle, the lightbulb candle, or the odd
candle would suggest that the participant recognized the fact that
the object is a candle despite its non-canonical visual features.
Thus, such responses would be classiﬁed as reﬂecting the object’s
actual identity. Responses such as the lightbulb, the toy lightbulb
or the weird lightbulb would be classiﬁed as reﬂecting the fact that
the participants did not recognize the fact that the object is a
candle.
As expected, in the identity-matched and appearance-matched
conditions, the object names reﬂected a judgment of object iden-
tity based on the perceptual features of objects (100% for each con-
dition). More important, participants overwhelmingly named the
visually misleading objects based on their appearance (98%) rather
than their identity (2%). For example, the candle that looked like a
lightbulb was called the lightbulb in all trials and the yo-yo that
looked like a baseball was called the baseball, the toy baseball, the
mini baseball, and the plastic baseball. Although the different labels
suggest that participants did not all conceptualize the visually mis-
leading objects in the same way, all the labels they provided nev-
ertheless conﬁrmed that, when the true identity of a visually
misleading object was not made apparent, this identity could not
be discerned from object’s outward appearance.Appendix B
B.1. Looking patterns across the analysis windows in Experiment 1
The mixed effects model revealed a main effect of knowledge
state, v2(2) = 12.59, p = 0.002, suggesting that consideration of
the competitor (across all competitor types and across the two
analysis windows) was overall lower in the privileged-existence
condition (likelihood = 0.03) than in the privileged-identity condi-
tion (likelihood = 0.14), v2(1) = 11.78, p < 0.001 or than in the
shared-knowledge condition (likelihood = 0.11), v2(1) = 9.76,
p = 0.002. Further, consideration of the competitor did not differ
in these latter two conditions, p = 0.940. These ﬁnding are consis-
tent with Barr (2008b) showing that when the competitor objects
were occluded from the speaker’s view, addressees were less likely
to look to these objects than when the competitor objects were vis-
ible to both an addressee and the speaker (shared-knowledge and
privileged-identity conditions). The mixed effects model revealed
that there was no main effect of competitor type (p = 0.106), sug-
gesting that consideration of the different types of competitors
was similar (across all knowledge states and the two analysis win-
dows). Finally, there was no Knowledge State  Competitor Type
interaction (p = 0.917), suggesting that consideration of different
types of competitors did not differ within different knowledge
state conditions across the two analysis windows.B.2. Looking patterns across the analysis windows in Experiment 2
The linear mixed effects model revealed a main effect of com-
petitor type, v2(2) = 6.20, p = 0.045, reﬂecting the pattern whereby
consideration of the visual control object (across all linguistic con-
text conditions and across the two analysis windows) was overall
lower (likelihood = 0.08) compared to regular phonological com-
petitors (likelihood = 0.16), v2(1) = 6.04, p = 0.014 or knowledge
based phonological competitors (likelihood = 0.17), v2(1) = 7.47,
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different for regular and knowledge-based phonological competi-
tors, p = 0.547. Furthermore, the lack of a signiﬁcant main effect
of linguistic context, p = 0.929, or an interaction between competi-
tor type and linguistic context, p = 0.792, suggests that this pattern
was consistent across the no-prior-mention and prior-mention
conditions.Appendix C
The proportion of ﬁxations to target and competitor objects
over time, across conditions (Experiment 1). The dashed lines
reﬂect the beginning and end of the critical analysis window
(200–700 ms after target noun [e.g., candy] onset), corresponding
to the temporary ambiguous portion of the noun.Shared Knowledge Privileged Existence Privileged Identity
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The proportion of ﬁxations to target and competitor objects
over time, across conditions (Experiment 2). The dashed linesreﬂect the beginning and end of the critical analysis window
(200–700 ms after target noun [e.g., candy] onset), corresponding
to the temporary ambiguous portion of the noun.No Prior Mention Prior Mention
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CompetitorAppendix E. Supplementary material
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in
the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2015.
05.001.
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